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Perhaps the quantum state represents information about reality, and not reality directly. Wave function
collapse is then possibly no more mysterious than a Bayesian update of a probability distribution given
new data. We consider models for quantum systems with measurement outcomes determined by an
underlying physical state of the system but where several quantum states are consistent with a single
underlying state—i.e., probability distributions for distinct quantum states overlap. Significantly, we
demonstrate by example that additional assumptions are always necessary to rule out such a model.
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Broadly speaking, physicists today view the quantum
state in one of two ways: in correspondence with the real
physical state of affairs or as representing only an agent’s
knowledge or information about some aspect of the physical
situation. The latter ‘‘epistemic’’ viewpoint is primarily
motivated by the obvious parallel between the quantum
process of instantaneous wave function collapse and the
classical procedure of instantaneous updating of a proba-
bility distribution, both of which occur upon the acquisition
of information regarding the outcome of a measurement
process. The epistemic view has a long history of illustrious
advocates [1–8]. In recent times, a research program has
arisen aimed at not only philosophically justifying the
epistemic view, but potentially deriving quantum theory
from more primitive considerations about information
and/or Bayesian reasoning [8–16].
At least two versions of the epistemic view can be
distinguished. One is operational: the quantum state rep-
resents information about which outcome will occur if a
measurement is performed on the system. Measurement
itself is treated as a primitive. The other is that the quantum
state represents information about some underlying physi-
cal state of the system, where this underlying state need not
be described by quantum theory.
In his 1935 letter to Schro¨dinger, in an attempt to explain
what he really meant in the EPR paper, Einstein writes
([17,18], p. 26): ‘‘But then for the same [real] state of [the
system] there are two (in general arbitrarily many) equally
justified , which contradicts the hypothesis of a one-to-
one or complete description of the real states.’’ Einstein
came to this conclusion, which he termed ‘‘incomplete-
ness’’ of the quantum state, using an argument based on
what we now call (following Schro¨dinger [19]) steering
[20]. Note that the question he raises here is not whether
there are multiple states of reality associated with a single
wave function (one possible type of incompleteness) but
rather whether there are multiple wave functions associ-
ated with a single real state. A natural way to understand
this is as an expression of the second kind of epistemic
view above—that a quantum state represents an agent’s
information about an underlying reality but is not part of
that reality itself.
Unfortunately, as shown later by Bell [21], Einstein’s
specific argument for incompleteness was based on a false
premise (locality). However, a question that stands on its
own and is the topic of this article remains: is it even
mathematically possible to find an embedding of quantum
theory in some deeper theory where the quantum states are
not always uniquely determined given the underlying
physical state? Following [20], we refer to such a possi-
bility as a c -epistemic interpretation of the quantum state.
Recently, a no-go theorem was proven [22] showing that
a c -epistemic interpretation is impossible. It is important
to note that a key assumption of the argument is prepara-
tion independence—situations where quantum theory as-
signs independent product states are presumed to be
completely describable by independently combining the
two purportedly deeper descriptions for each system. Here,
we will show via explicit constructions that, when this
assumption is dropped, c -epistemic models can be con-
structed with all quantum predictions retained. Hence, we
show that not only is the ‘‘preparation independence’’
assumption of that particular no-go theorem necessary,
but also any similar no-go theorem will also require non-
trivial assumptions beyond those required for a well-
formed ontological model.
One of the most compelling motivations for exploring
the c -epistemic view is the amazing range of phenomena,
normally considered uniquely quantum, that can be derived
by imposing only a simple principle restricting an agent’s
knowledge about a presumed underlying reality [8,23,24].
It is clear that the primary reason these theories do manage
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to reproduce so many quantumlike phenomena is that the
states of knowledge (probability distributions) overlap on a
nontrivial subset of the underlying space of ‘‘hidden’’
states, even when the agent’s knowledge is maximal (the
equivalent of a quantum pure state).
These toy theories do not, however, reproduce all quan-
tum states and measurement statistics. About such theories
which do reproduce all of quantum theory, much less is
known—the main examples and constraints are outlined in
[25]. In [26], Hardy showed that the underlying mathe-
matical space of real states on which such theories are
defined—the ‘‘ontic state’’ space—must have at least the
cardinality of the integers. Spekkens [27] showed that the
models must be preparation contextual in addition to
measurement contextual [28]. The manifold dimension of
the ontic state space was shown by Montina [29] to be
necessarily exponential, assuming that the dynamics of the
ontic states is Markovian; he then went on to show the
intriguing result that it is possible to reduce the manifold
dimension by one [30,31]. This latter construction results
in probability distributions that intersect in the ontic state
space; however, they do so only on a set of measure 0. The
question of economic representation of finite data in such
models [15,32–34] has also received some attention.
In another pair of recent works [35,36], Colbeck and
Renner have argued that, given additional assumptions of
experimenters’ free choice in choosing measurement set-
tings and no superluminal signaling of the choice at the
ontic level, the ontic states must be in one-to-one corre-
spondence with the quantum states. The models of the
present Letter are explicitly constructed for single systems
only and, if applied to systems composed of multiple
separated subsystems, would involve superluminal influ-
ences of measurement choices upon ontic variables.
Hence, our results are consistent with those of [35,36].
Formal statement of the problem.—Following [20], an
ontological model for a quantum system defines a measure
space , the elements  of which are termed ontic states.
These should be thought of as the underlying physical
states that a system can be in at a given time. A pure
quantum state jc i corresponds to an equivalence class of
experimental preparations and is represented within an
ontological model as a probability distribution c ðÞ
over . The distribution c is called an epistemic state.
It represents the information that an agent has about the
ontic state of a system, given that it was prepared in a
particular way. Dynamics correspond to trajectories of
ontic states through , and these map to dynamical
changes in the probability distributions over. This setting
includes the standard Hilbert space description through the
trivial assignment of  as the complex projective space
CPd1 (the boundary of the quantum state space), with
c ðÞ being a delta-function distribution centered at  ¼
jc ihc j [37]. It is for this reason the term ‘‘ontic’’ is used—
as opposed to ‘‘hidden,’’ for example.
Throughout, we shall consider only projective
measurements on a finite d-dimensional quantum
system, described as a string of rank-one projectors  ¼
fj0ih0j; . . . ; jd1ihd1jg, where Pkjkihkj ¼ 1. If
a measurement is performed, the probabilities for different
outcomes are defined by the ontic state  of the system.
Hence, each measurement is associated with a set of d
response functions fk : ! ½0; 1g, where kðÞ is the
probability of obtaining the outcome jkihkj when the
ontic state of the system is . The response functions are
positive semidefinite and normalized so that
P
kkðÞ ¼
1;8. If the kðÞ take values only in f0; 1g, the model is
deterministic. By the Kochen-Specker theorem [28], a
deterministic ontological model for a quantum system
must be measurement contextual [25] if the system has
dimension d  3. This means that the response function
k depends on the complete set of comeasured projectors
in . We do not indicate this dependence for notational
simplicity.
An ontological model is successful in explaining quan-
tum measurement statistics for measurement and prepa-
ration jc i if and only if it is the case that 8k:
Z

kðÞdc ¼
Z

c ðÞkðÞd ¼ jhkjc ij2: (1)
With these basic ingredients in place, an ontological
model is c -epistemic if at least two distinct quantum states
jc 1i and jc 2i are described by distributions c 1 and c 2
such that the intersection of their supports has nonzero
measure, as shown schematically in Fig. 1. An ontological
model is c -ontic otherwise [20,27]. The idea here is that,
in a c -ontic model, the quantum state is uniquely deter-
mined by the ontic state , since, for any , there is only
one jc i such that  is contained in the support of c . In
FIG. 1 (color online). Schematic of two ontic state spaces in
different ontological models. The supports of epistemic states
associated with four quantum states are shown. In (a), each ontic
state is in the support of the epistemic state for at most one c :
the model is c -ontic. In (b), those ontic states in the highlighted
‘‘epistemic region’’ E do not uniquely identify a quantum state
and could result from either of the associated preparation pro-
cedures: the model is c -epistemic.
PRL 109, 150404 (2012) P HY S I CA L R EV I EW LE T T E R S
week ending
12 OCTOBER 2012
150404-2
this case, although the quantum state jc i plays an episte-
mic role in defining a distribution c , the quantum state is
also a function of the ontic state and hence can justifiably
be thought of as a physical property of the system.
Informally, the whole of the quantum state jc i is ‘‘written
into’’ the real state of affairs.
In a c -epistemic model, on the other hand, there are at
least some circumstances in which two different quantum
states describe systems in the same ontic state . In this
case, it is defensible to claim that the quantum state
‘‘merely’’ represents an agent’s information. A stronger
definition of the term c -epistemic would require that, for
any nonorthogonal states, jc 1i and jc 2i, the distributions
c 1 and c 2 overlap. In this Letter, we stick with the
weaker definition above.
The original Bell model.—As a counterexample to
‘‘von Neumann’s silly assumption,’’ Bell [21] described a
simple ontological model capable of describing a quantum
system of dimension d. The ontic state space consists of
pairs ðji; xÞ, where ji is an element of CPd1 and x is an
element of the interval [0,1]. For the moment, consider
d ¼ 2. The ontic state space is then isomorphic to  ¼
S2  ½0; 1, where S2 is the two-dimensional Bloch sphere.
The quantum state jc i corresponds to a distribution
c ð^; xÞ ¼ ð^ c^ Þ, where the convention here, and in
what follows, is to denote the unit Bloch vector associated
to jc i as c^ . This choice of distribution is uniform over the
subset fðc^ ; xÞ: 0  x  1g. The model is deterministic,
with response functions given by
kð^; xÞ ¼ ½ðjhj0ij2  xÞð1Þk; (2)
where  is the Heaviside step function. For a projective
measurement outcome jihj and a quantum state jc i, the
Born rule is satisfied, since
Z
d^dxc ð^; xÞð^; xÞ ¼ jhc jij2: (3)
Note—as Bell did—that there are many possible choices
for the response functions that would work equally well.
The only requirement is that the support over the subset
fð^; xÞ: 0  x  1g has measure equal to the probability
occurring in the Born rule; how this support is distributed is
entirely arbitrary.
A c -epistemic modification of the Bell model for a
qubit.—The Bell model is c -ontic, since no two epistemic
states, corresponding to distinct quantum states, overlap. A
different ontological model for qubit systems was
described by Kochen and Specker [28], which is
c -epistemic. To date, however, no one has extended
Kochen and Specker’s model to systems of higher dimen-
sion than two [38]. Here, we show how the Bell model can
be modified in order to obtain a c -epistemic model for
qubits. Later, this model is extended to obtain a
c -epistemic model for quantum systems of arbitrary finite
dimension.
A simple visualization of the ontic state space  as an
annulus with ^ specifying the direction and x the radial
distance is depicted in Fig. 2(a). Let z^ correspond to the
north pole of the Bloch sphere, and let ^  z^ ¼ cosðÞ,
where  is the polar angle of the Bloch vector ^. Label
the upper ( < =2) hemisphere R0 and the lower
( > =2) hemisphere R1. Given a projective measure-
ment ¼ fj0ih0j; j1ih1jg, assume that the outcomes
are labeled such that jh0jzij2  jh1jzij2.
With response functions defined as in Eq. (2), the ontic
states in the set
E 0 ¼ fð^; xÞ: ^2R0 and 0 x< ð1 sinÞ=2g (4)
all result in the ^0 outcome for any measurement .
Similarly, those in the set
E 1¼fð^;xÞ: ^2R1 and ð1þ sinÞ=2<x 1g (5)
all result in the ^1 outcome. These sets are illustrated in
Fig. 2(b).
In order to construct a c -epistemic model, note that, if
an epistemic state c assigns nonzero probability to the
subset E0, then this much probability weight can be redis-
tributed over E0 without changing the Born rule statistics.
This is because ontic states in E0 behave identically to
one another, as far as predictions for quantum measure-
ment outcomes go. The same argument applies to the
subset E1. Hence, define a modified Bell model such that,
for c^ 2R0,
c ð^; xÞ ¼ ð^ c^ Þ½x 12ð1 sinc Þ
þ 12ð1 sinc ÞE0ð^; xÞ;
where c is the polar angle of c^ and E0 is essentially
arbitrary but can be taken to be the uniform distribution
FIG. 2 (color online). (a) Modified Bell model ontic state
space along with supports of a response function for the outcome
^0 [inner shaded (green) area], ^1 [outer shaded (blue) area],
and the epistemic statec (thick red line). The inner circle is the
surface of the Bloch sphere; the dashed line indicates that it also
corresponds to x¼0. The outer solid circle corresponds to x¼1.
(b) Modified Bell model, showing the subsets E0 and E1. Any
probability weight that c gives to ontic states within E0 can be
redistributed over E0.
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over E0. A similar expression defines c for states with
c^ 2R1.
The modified Bell model still reproduces the Born rule,
but now the model is c -epistemic. Any two quantum states
in the same hemisphere are described by distributions that
overlap, either in E0 or in E1. The preparation of an ontic
state from either of these regions does not reveal a unique
quantum state but only reveals in which hemisphere the
quantum state resides.
Generalization to higher dimensions.—Here, we modify
the Bell model to produce a c -epistemic model for an
arbitrary finite dimension. The ontic state space for the
d-dimensional Bell model is  ¼ CPd1  ½0; 1. The
distribution corresponding to a quantum state jc i is given
by c ðji; xÞ ¼ ðji  jc iÞ. Response functions for a
measurement  are defined such that k has support of
length jhkjij2 on the line segment fðji; xÞ: 0  x  1g.
Up to this constraint, the response functions are arbitrary.
This model is c -ontic, since the delta functions do not
overlap for distinct jc i.
In order to construct a c -epistemic model, fix an arbi-
trary preferred state j0i. For each measurement , assume
that the outcomes are ordered such that jh0j0ij2 
jh1j0ij2      jhd1j0ij2. Fix the response functions
so that
kðji; xÞ ¼ 1 if
Xk1
i¼0
jhjiij2  x<
Xk
i¼0
jhjiij2 (6)
and
kðji; xÞ ¼ 0 otherwise: (7)
In Eq. (6),
P
k1
i¼1 jhjiij2 is taken to be 0 when k ¼ 0. For
completeness, let us specify that, for x ¼ 1, kðji;xÞ¼1
if and only if k ¼ d 1.
Now, the aim is to define a subset E0 of, such that ontic
states in E0 predict the same outcomes for all measure-
ments. To this end, note that jh0j0ij2  1=d. Given this, it
is easy to show that, if jhj0ij2 > d1d , then jh0jij2 > 0.
For arbitrary ji, let
zðjiÞ ¼ inf
ji: jhj0ij21=d
jhjij2; (8)
where an explicit expression is easily found but not needed.
Define
E 0 ¼

ðji; xÞ: jhj0ij2 >d 1
d
and 0 x < zðjiÞ

:
(9)
Any ontic state  2 E0 has the property that, whatever
measurement is performed, the outcome is j0ih0j. The
epistemic states can therefore be modified as above to
produce a c -epistemic model. Informally, the idea is the
same: any probability thatc assigns to ontic states within
the set E0 can be redistributed over the whole of E0 without
changing the Born rule statistics. More specifically, when
jhc j0ij2  ðd 1Þ=d, let
c ðji; xÞ ¼ ðji  jc iÞ; (10)
and, when jhc j0ij2 > ðd 1Þ=d, let
c ðji; xÞ ¼ ðji  jc iÞ½x zðjc iÞ
þ zðjc iÞE0ðji; xÞ; (11)
where, as above, E0 is arbitrary but could be taken to be
the uniform distribution over E0.
This model is clearly very contrived. A degree of sym-
metry could be restored by postulating a preferred basis
j0i; . . . ; jd 1i, instead of a preferred state. If jhjjij2 >
ðd 1Þ=d for some j, then relabel measurement outcomes
such that jh0jjij2  jh1jjij2      jhd1jjij2. In
this case, jh0jij2 > 0, and the sets Ej can be defined in
analogy with E0 above. For any state jc i with jhc jjij2 >
ðd 1Þ=d, any probability assigned to ontic states within
Ej can be redistributed over Ej. This results in a model that
is ‘‘more epistemic’’ than the one above. It is an open
question whether more natural models can be found.
Discussion.—Our results are particularly pertinent,
given the recent no-go theorem of [22]. The theorem shows
that it is not possible to construct c -epistemic models of
quantum theory, given an assumption that independent
preparations produce uncorrelated ontic states. The present
Letter shows that c -epistemic models are possible if that
assumption is given up. None of these models is intuitive
or motivated by physical principles or considerations.
The primary motivation for exploring the possibility of
c -epistemic models is to understand the formal limitations
of reproducing quantum theory from a deeper theory.
Such models may also play a useful role in other areas of
quantum information. The remarkable protocols of Toner
and Bacon [39] for recovering the bipartite measurement
statistics of a singlet state and classical simulation of tele-
portation—using only 1 and 2 bits (respectively) of classi-
cal communication—make use of shared randomness in a
way that lets the problem be recast in terms of correlated
single qubit ontological models that are c -epistemic. A
related result has been obtained by Montina [40], who has
also put bounds on the classical simulation cost for an
arbitrary number of qubits.
There remain many open questions. In the models pre-
sented, it is not the case that c has nonzero overlap with
 for any pair of nonorthogonal quantum states jc i and
ji. Hence, the models do not satisfy the stronger defini-
tion of c -epistemic suggested above. It would be interest-
ing to establish whether such models exist. (Scott
Aaronson has recently combined some of the ideas that
were presented in a preprint version of this article with
those of George Lowther to answer this question in the
affirmative; see [41].)
PRL 109, 150404 (2012) P HY S I CA L R EV I EW LE T T E R S
week ending
12 OCTOBER 2012
150404-4
The authors gratefully acknowledge support from the
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council
(P. G. L., J. B., and T. R.), the Leverhulme Foundation
(T. R.), and the Royal Commission for the Exhibition of
1851 (D. J.).
*1@physics.org
[1] A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen, Phys. Rev. 47, 777
(1935).
[2] K. R. Popper, Quantum Theory and Reality, edited by M.
Bunge (Springer, New York, 1967), Chap. 1.
[3] L. E. Ballentine, Rev. Mod. Phys. 42, 358 (1970).
[4] R. E. Peierls, Surprises in Theoretical Physics (Princeton
University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1979), p. 32.
[5] E. T. Jaynes, Foundations of Radiation Theory and
Quantum Electrodynamics (Plenum, New York, 1980).
[6] M. Gell-Mann, J. Hahtle, R. B. Griffiths, A. Zeilinger,
R. T. Nachtrieb, J. L. Anderson, A. C. Dotson, W.G.
Hoover, H.M. Bradford, and S. Goldstein, Phys. Today
52, No. 2, 11 (1999).
[7] C.M. Caves, C. A. Fuchs, and R. Schack, Phys. Rev. A 65,
022305 (2002).
[8] R.W. Spekkens, Phys. Rev. A 75, 032110 (2007).
[9] C. Brukner and A. Zeilinger, Phys. Rev. A 63, 022113
(2001).
[10] C. A. Fuchs, arXiv:1003.5209.
[11] M. S. Leifer, Phys. Rev. A 74, 042310 (2006).
[12] M. S. Leifer and R.W. Spekkens, arXiv:1107.5849.
[13] M. S. Leifer and R.W. Spekkens, arXiv:1110.1085.
[14] H. Barnum and A. Wilce, arXiv:0908.2352.
[15] L. Hardy, arXiv:quant-ph/0101012.
[16] J. Barrett, Phys. Rev. A 75, 032304 (2007).
[17] A. Einstein, unpublished letter to E. Schro¨dinger, EA 22-
047, 19th June 1935.
[18] D. Howard, Revising the Einstein-Bohr Dialogue, http://
www.nd.edu/~dhoward1/Revisiting%20the%20Einstein-
Bohr%20Dialogue.pdf.
[19] E. Schro¨dinger, Math. Proc. Cambridge Philos. Soc. 31,
555 (1935).
[20] N. Harrigan and R. Spekkens, Found. Phys. 40, 125
(2010).
[21] J. S. Bell, Rev. Mod. Phys. 38, 447 (1966).
[22] M. F. Pusey, J. Barrett, and T. Rudolph, Nature Phys. 8,
476 (2012).
[23] L. Hardy, arXiv:quant-ph/9906123.
[24] S. D. Bartlett, T. Rudolph, and R.W. Spekkens, Phys. Rev.
A 86, 012103 (2012).
[25] N. Harrigan and T. Rudolph, arXiv:0709.4266.
[26] L. Hardy, Stud. Hist. Phil. Mod. Phys. 35, 267 (2004).
[27] R.W. Spekkens, Phys. Rev. A 71, 052108 (2005).
[28] S. Kochen and E. P. Specker, J. Math. Mech. 17, 59 (1967).
[29] A. Montina, Phys. Rev. A 77, 022104 (2008).
[30] A. Montina, Phys. Rev. A 83, 032107 (2011).
[31] A. Montina, Phys. Lett. A 375, 1385 (2011).
[32] E. F. Galva˜o, Phys. Rev. A 80, 022106 (2009).
[33] B. Dakic´, M. Sˇuvakov, T. Paterek, and C. Brukner, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 101, 190402 (2008).
[34] S. Wehner, M. Christandl, and A. C. Doherty, Phys. Rev. A
78, 062112 (2008).
[35] R. Colbeck and R. Renner, Nature Commun. 2, 411 (2011).
[36] R. Colbeck and R. Renner, Phys. Rev. Lett. 108, 150402
(2012).
[37] E. G. Beltrametti and S. Bugajski, J. Phys. A 28, 3329
(1995).
[38] T. Rudolph, arXiv:quant-ph/0608120v1.
[39] B. F. Toner and D. Bacon, Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 187904
(2003).
[40] A. Montina, Phys. Rev. A 84, 042307 (2011).
[41] S. Aaronson and G. Lowther, Psiepistemic theories in 3 or
more dimensions, http://mathoverflow.net/questions/95537/
psiepistemic-%20theories-in-3-or-more-dimensions.
PRL 109, 150404 (2012) P HY S I CA L R EV I EW LE T T E R S
week ending
12 OCTOBER 2012
150404-5
